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In this commentary, we endorse concerns about the health impact of the trans-pacific partnership (TPP), paying 
particular attention to its mechanisms for investor state dispute settlement. We then describe the different, judge-
led approach being advocated by the European Commission team negotiating the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, arguing that, while not perfect, it offers significant advantages. 
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The difference between individual and public health is often illustrated by the classic tale of two people on the bank of a river down which drowning bodies 
are floating. One person, representing individual clinicians, 
works frantically to pull the bodies to safety. The other person, 
representing public health professionals, instead runs rapidly 
upstream to stop the crazed individual pushing their victims 
off the bridge. 
Yet, increasingly, we recognise that the cause of this suffering 
is not a single individual on a bridge. Instead, at the source of 
the river, we can see the headquarters of large multi-national 
corporations using ever more sophisticated tactics to lure 
victims to their fate. Public health professionals who have 
the audacity to suggest that the bridges from which they are 
falling might be protected with guardrails are ridiculed for 
promoting a “nanny state.” In other words, we have discovered 
the commercial determinants of health.1 
These powerful multi-national corporations drive global 
patterns of disease.2 Some, such as the tobacco and arms 
industries, profit from sales of products that kill people 
directly. Others, such as the food and sugar sweetened beverage 
industries, have a less direct impact, using combinations of 
pricing, marketing, and distribution to replace traditional 
nutritious foods.3 And finally there are those whose goal is 
to improve health, such as the pharmaceutical industry, but 
which adopts strategies that maximise their profits, even 
though this may deny life-saving medicines to those in most 
need.4
Several decades of corporate consolidation and concentration, 
driven by ever more mergers and acquisitions, mean that 
many of these corporate actors are now far larger, and much 
more powerful than individual countries. In the case of food, 
just 5 companies control over 40% of world food trade.5 These 
powerful corporations can, in effect, dictate policy to elected 
governments, for example by threatening to withhold foreign 
investment. Unlike smaller domestic companies, these multi-
nationals can extract concessions on taxation, government 
subsidies, including investment in the infrastructure to 
serve their needs,6 and where these fail, they can employ 
mechanisms such as transfer pricing7 to ensure that their 
profits are banked in a low tax jurisdiction and thus, they can 
avoid giving anything back to the countries in which they are 
operating. These corporations are able to extract these rents 
because governments allow them to, and the power of labour 
to keep these forces in check has been weakened. 
As the accompanying paper by Labonté and colleagues point 
out, governments negotiate regional and global trade deals 
that, while ostensibly removing barriers to trade, such as 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, have much more to do with 
creating a market environment favourable to large companies. 
In effect these trade agreements transfer enormous power to 
multi-national corporations. Harmonisation of standards in 
areas such as environmental protection and health and safety 
has lowered them to the lowest common denominator. They 
have adopted and enforced intellectual property regimes that 
confer ownership of knowledge, much of it generated with 
public funding, on private corporations.8 
The public health community has, in many cases belatedly, 
recognised the importance of these agreements, drawing 
attention to their secrecy and their often damaging effects on 
health, for example by demonstrating empirically the strong 
link between trade liberalisation and consumption of health 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between sch lars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises nd greater openness wh n it comes t  advocacy.1
We c mmend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss t e politics of glob l health without discussing the 
n rmative premises behind the politics.”1 Bu  what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted
through co flict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of
antagonism which I tak  to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
   View Video Summary
li i    i  l l l   i i  l  
 li
t  i ti  t  t lt    s i s tis :  
ll  f s i  t  s, liti s   f l l lt
le et s ei , risti  egge , ivi  ge retse *
bstract
In a recent article, orik o s has dra n attention to the nor ative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. e clai  that o s is indirectly sub itting to a liberal conception of politics by fra ing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual orality. ra ing on the theoretical orks of 
hantal ouffe, e introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to o s’ conception. 
sing controversies surrounding edical treat ent of I S patients in developing countries as a case e 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
obilization based on such an articulation.
ey ords: lobal ealth, Liberal Politics, hantal ouffe, onflict, I S, ntiretroviral ( ) 
reat ent 
opyright:  2016 by er an niversity of edical Sciences
itation: skhei  , eggen , Engebr tsen E. Politics and po e  in global health: the constituting rol  of 
conflicts:  o ent on “ avigating bet een stealth advocacy and unconscious dog atis : the challenge 
of res arching the nor s, politics and po er of global heal h.” Int J eal h Policy anag. 2016;5(2):117–
119. doi:10.15171/ijhp .2015.188
* orrespondence to:
Eivind Engebretsen
E ail: eivind.engebretsen edisin.uio.no
rticle istory:
Received: 5 Septe ber 2015
Accepted: 13 ctober 2015
ePublished: 15 ctober 2015
Institute of ealth and ociety, Faculty of edicine, niversity of slo, slo, or ay
http://ijhp .co
Int J Health Policy anag 2016, 5(2), 117–119 doi 10.15171/ijhp .2015.188
 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y g al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es to a v cacy.1
e co e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al ealt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  is a ficti ,” a  t at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r le f litics a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
i  ec e i  s e  e states t at “it is t ss le t  
isc ss e litic f gl l ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f
t e litical, ere “t e litical el g t r l gical
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te  
t r g  c nflict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  r er is create , rga izi g a  
c existe ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  c s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s se  t e case f “i creasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g
 I S treat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fra es t e 
   View Video Su ary
McKee and Stuckler
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(3), 177–179178
damaging products.9
Labonté and colleagues, who have pioneered research on the 
health effects of international trade deals, make an important 
contribution by analysing in detail the health impact of one 
of the most controversial of these agreements, the trans-
pacific partnership (TPP).10 They identify five elements 
of this agreement that give cause for concern: changes to 
intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical barriers to trade, investor state dispute 
settlement processes, and regulatory coherence on issues such 
as health systems and policy. If the TPP is actually ratified 
then, as they note, there are potentially severe implications 
for health. However, in their final paragraph they also inject 
a note of caution. The TPP might never be ratified by the 
US government. At the time of writing, President Obama is 
making a final effort to get it through Congress before the 
end of his term in office, knowing that both main presidential 
candidates are opposed to it.
The TPP is, however, only one of a number of major trade 
deals currently being negotiated. Another, which has also 
attracted widespread attention, is the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). This seeks to reduce barriers 
to trade between the United States and the European Union 
(EU) and has many features that are similar to the TPP. And, 
as with the TPP, its future is now uncertain, with growing 
opposition in both Europe and the United States, including 
on grounds of public health.11,12
The TTIP is, however, different in at least one way that 
has implications for international trade agreements more 
generally. As Labonté and colleagues note, the public health 
community has expressed great concern about existing 
investor state dispute settlement processes. These enable 
private companies to seek damages from governments 
whose policies appropriate their property or reduce their 
current and future income. They have increased markedly in 
number in the past decade, with many evolving challenges to 
health or environmental protection. The resolution process 
is secretive and expensive, and there is little opportunity to 
inject consideration of public policies beyond trade, such as 
the promotion of health. Unsurprisingly, it is an approach 
favoured by corporations. 
The current investor state dispute settlement process is rigged 
in favour of multi-national corporations, for two reasons. 
First, it advantages those with the greatest resources. For many 
small countries, the cost of defending their position can be 
prohibitive. In a recent landmark case, Uruguay did manage 
to defeat a challenge to its tobacco control policies, but only 
with considerable financial support from the philanthropist 
Michael Bloomberg.13 On several occasions, the government 
considered conceding because of the escalating costs. As has 
been noted elsewhere, the very existence of this process has a 
chilling effect on governments seeking to promote health.14 
Second, it provides a setting in which corporations often win. 
This is in marked contrast to the courts that ordinary citizens 
depend upon. In a systematic review of litigation, frequently 
involving constitutional law, initiated by the tobacco industry 
against governments, we showed that the industry almost 
always fails and, on the rare occasions when it succeeds 
initially, the courts provide clear guidance on how the law can 
be clarified to ensure that the government policy is ultimately 
sustained.15
These concerns explain why public health advocates in 
Europe have focused their attention on the investor state 
dispute settlement process in the TTIP. Importantly, they have 
achieved some success. The EU’s negotiating position argues 
for a number of important safeguards. One is the exclusion 
of the health sector from competition clauses, recognising 
that markets for healthcare are rife with failures. For example, 
European governments will not be forced to concede their 
power to maintain monopolies in the provision of health 
services, which is especially important to National Health 
Systems in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, among 
others. The EU also insists on being able to provide subsidies 
to healthcare service providers, including selective subsidies 
to those based within the EU. And they will retain the right 
to regulate essential public services, for example by setting 
quality standards or accreditation mechanisms. 
Perhaps most interesting is the ISDS process itself. Unlike the 
traditional approach to ISDS, in which decisions are made 
by arbitrators, the EU is insisting that the process should be 
overseen by publicly appointed, legally qualified judges. These 
should be selected at random from a qualified pool and should 
be free of conflicts of interest, which is not always the case 
at present. The grounds for seeking resolution of the dispute 
would be much more narrowly defined than at present, for 
example by being limited to discrimination on grounds of 
gender, race, religion, or nationality. All proceedings should 
be transparent, with documentation publicly available. 
Crucially, all parties with the legitimate interest in the dispute, 
which would include advocates for health, environmental 
protection, or human rights, would have a right to intervene. 
In these ways, the EU is proposing a radically different way 
of resolving international trade disputes. It is not, however, at 
all clear whether these will be acceptable to the United States 
and, as a number of European governments and the European 
Parliament have made clear that these are lines in the sand, it 
is far from certain that the TTIP will ever be ratified.
Yet, whether the EU will get what it wants in the negotiations is 
unclear. The Danish physicist Nils Bohr famously commented 
that “prediction is difficult, especially about the future.” Since 
the paper by Labonté and colleagues was published, the citizens 
of the United Kingdom have, inexplicably, voted to leave the 
EU. Whether the British government ever succeeds in doing 
so is itself far from certain, given dawning recognition of the 
enormous complexity of the task and the growing evidence 
that the ministers charged with extracting the country from 
the EU have only the sketchiest understanding of either 
European structures or international trade. However, among 
the many mutually contradictory and rapidly changing 
policies being advocated by British politicians, it is clear that 
there is an unwillingness to remain subject to rulings by the 
European Court of Justice. This, it must be remembered, is 
the court that has consistently observed the European Treaty 
obligation that the highest standard of health must be included 
in all EU policies. Instead, several of the politicians seem to be 
advocating a relationship with the EU based on World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) provisions. This position appeared 
briefly in a somewhat confused press release posted fleetingly 
by the UK’s newly created Department for International Trade 
that was rapidly withdrawn as “an error.” Such an approach 
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would lack any of these aforementioned protections.
Ironically, the more populist advocates of leaving the EU 
invoked the TTIP, which they presented as a vehicle for 
corporate influence, as a reason for voting to leave. Yet, if 
they ever managed to negotiate a separate free-trade deal 
with the United States, a goal that seems vanishingly unlikely 
given the complete absence of British trade negotiators, it is 
almost certain that it too will lack any of the protections being 
insisted upon by the EU in its transatlantic dealings.16
In this commentary, we have looked at the other major 
trade deal currently being negotiated and show that, in at 
least one respect, the way that it addresses disputes between 
governments and corporations, there is an alternative 
approach. This will not solve all of the problems associated 
with TTIP, by any means, but it does show that there are some 
things that can be done to tackle some of its worst features. 
Labonté and colleagues have done much more than comment 
on the threats posed by the TPP. They have also provided 
a very useful template against which all future trade deals 
should be evaluated. They have offered a new approach to 
confronting those crazed individuals at the source of the 
river who threaten the public’s health. Clearly, developing 
new tools and approaches for responding to the commercial 
determinants of health is a topic that will continue to attract 
the attention of public health researchers and advocates for 
many years to come.
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